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1 INTRODUCTION 
The creation of provinces in 1994 gave effect to the grand compromise of the 
1993 negotiations, but also raised fears about the deleterious consequences 
they could hold for national cohesion. A first concern was that provinces 
would work against national political cohesion, fanning the fires of separa-
tism and entrenching ethnic enclaves. In 1993 an apparent case in point 
presented itself when the KwaZulu Legislature, dominated by Chief Mangosu-
thu Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), adopted a draft constitution for 
the then non-existent state of KwaZulu-Natal which would operate in a 
confederal system for South Africa (Ellmann 1993). Similarly, the fear was that 
a Western Cape governed by the National Party (NP) would perpetuate the 
apartheid legacy. Both the IFP and NP, however, deemed themselves national 
parties, and they, too, wanted to be part of the national scene where 
resources and power were mainly located. 
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Adding to these fears was a second concern that, given that key social 
functions were to be shared by the national government and provinces, 
devolution would lead to a lack of governance cohesion and result in poor 
service delivery to citizens. Moreover, considering how new most of the 
provinces (and later municipalities) were, a third concern was that devolu-
tion could impair social cohesion if subnational governments failed the 
inhabitants in their jurisdiction. 
These negative consequences of devolution were addressed through 
various constitutional measures. At national level, the nation, divided into 
provinces, was brought together politically in the national legislature, though 
only marginally so in the national executive. Intergovernmental institutions 
and processes, including provinces and local government, sought to engage 
with the challenges of incoherent government, while national supervisory 
powers over provinces (and provinces over municipalities) aimed to guard 
against and correct state failure at subnational level. · 
Because all three dimensions of national cohesion concern the exercise of 
state power, political contestation and competition inevitably came to the 
fore, testing not only the adequacy of constitutional design but also, and more 
importantly, the political culture of democracy and tolerance in which 
intergovernmental relations should be embedded. South Africa has been 
grappling with these issues over the past two decades and may provide some 
instructive lessons for Kenya. 
2 HISTORICAL CONI'EXT 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the main liberation movement in South Africa, the 
African National Congress (ANC), advocated a strong centralised system of 
government in order to effect the radical transformation of the apartheid 
state. The white minority government, on the other hand, sought to limit the 
prospect of the ANC controlling all levers of power and thus propagated a 
federal solution that would weaken the centre. Aiming to build a nation from 
the fractured past, the ANC vehemently opposed federalism because it feared 
this would perpetuate. the divide-and-rule policy of apartheid's ethnic-based 
Bantustans. The compromise that was eventually reached was not federalism 
but something more attenuated and best referred to as 'devolution', in the 
way the term is used in the Kenyan Constitution. 
The AN C's acceptance, albeit reluctant, of provinces was made palatable by 
adopting the German model of 'cooperative' government rather than the 
American one of 'competitive federalism' (Murray and Simeon 2009). In 
Powell's words (see Chapter 2), this saw the establishment of a 'fudged 
federalism', in terms of which provinces had hardly any significant exclusive 
powers, seeing as all functional areas of service delivery were to be exercised 
concurrently with the national government. The elevation of local govern-
ment to a sphere of government by the 1996 Constitution further reduced the 
powers of provinces. Moreover, although no national intervention powers 
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were provided in the interim Constitution, they became a prominent feature 
of the 1996 Constitution. 
3 INCLUSION AND COHESION THROUGH THE NATIONAL 
LEGISLATIJRE AND EXECUTIVE 
The major breakthrough in the 1993 negotiations was agreement on the 
principle of a government of national unity, one which would thus avoid a 
winner-takes-all outcome. Specifically' in the interests of nation-building, 
minority parties gaining above 20 and five per cent of the seats in the National 
Assembly were entitled to designate a deputy president and a member of the 
national cabinet, respectively. This was a temporary measure for the first 
Parliament, but had only a partial life because in 1996 the NP vacated both the 
deputy presidency and the cabinet posts; the IFP remained in the cabinet, and 
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was appointed on occasions even as acting 
president. The ANC continued the practice of an inclusive (though very 
diluted) cabinet from the second Parliament onwards, with the president 
inviting leaders of mostly small minority parties to serve as ministers. 
The principle of a government of national unity had no direct provincial 
dimension, but, as above, was linked instead to political-party representation 
in the national executive. In contrast, the composition of the national 
legislature has, theoretically, a strong provincial basis. 
3.1 National Parliament 
The national Parliament with its two chambers - the directly elected 
National Assembly (NA) and the indirectly elected National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) - functions within the usual limitations of the Westmin-
ster parliamentary system. Unlike Kenya's complete separation between the 
legislature and the executive, the executive is drawn from the NA which, in 
turn, dominates the NCOP. 
3.1.1 NationalAssembly 
With the specific purpose of securing as inclusive an NA as possible, 
proportional representation based on party lists was the overarching 
principle of the electoral system from the start (see De Vtlle 1996). With only 
a natural threshold, any party receiving 0.25 per cent of the national vote (or 
even less) is entitled to one of the 400 seats in the NA. In practice this has 
meant that provincially-based parties, such as the United Christian Democra-
tic Party (North West) and Minority Front (KwaZulu-Natal), were represented 
(Petlane 2009). The number of minority (and micro-) parties has doubled 
from six in 1994 to 12 in 2014. 
The electoral system was also to give further content to the devolved 
nature of the South African state by providing for provincial party lists; half of 
the 400 MPs are elected on a national political party list, while the remaining 
200 are elected on provincial party lists (proportionally split between the 
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nine provinces), with the proviso that the overall allocation of seats ensures 
overall proportional representation. 
Theoretically, then, there is strong provincial representation in the NA. 
However, this arrangement has had hardly any impact on the functioning of 
the NA. No noticeable provincial voices have been heard, which is not 
surprising given that the ANC has captured between 62 and 69 per cent of the 
vote (62.l per cent in 2014) in the past five elections, in addition to 
exercising strong party hierarchy and discipline. Even the official opposition 
party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), with its strong base in the Western Cape, 
speaks and functions as a national party. The only value of the two party lists 
is that political parties are compelled to ensure an equitable spread of 
representatives across all provinces. 
3.1.2 National Council of Provinces 
The NCOP is designed to perform a strong integrating function, namely 
bringing provinces into important national decisions to represent provincial 
interests. With close links to the provincial legislatures, delegates to the 
NCOP also play an important role in informing provincial legislatures about 
national interests (Murray and Simeon 1999). 
The NCOP is an unhappy concoction of parts hailing from the German 
Bundestag, US Senate and British House of Lords. It comprises 90 members, 
consisting in turn of ten-member delegations from each province (a 
Bundesrat concept, with the equal-representation element borrowed from 
the US Senate). The delegation is split into two components. Six members are 
elected by the provincial legislature to represent it in the NCOP for the 
duration of the national Parliament; they are 'permanent' delegates but may 
be recalled and removed at any time by the provincial legislature. The other 
four 'special' delegates are members of the provincial legislature, with the 
provincial premier the leader of the delegation (a la the Bundesrat). There are 
also ten non-voting occasional members from organised local government. 
Although the NCOP has only a partial veto with regard to legislation 
affecting provinces (section 76 bills, discussed below), it has a stronger role in 
deciding major national issues which have no direct bearing on provinces. 
First, the NCOP must approve by a majority of six provinces any amendment 
dealing with the foundational values of the Constitution (s 1) or the Bill of 
Rights (s 74). Secondly, reminiscent of the US Senate, it co-determines with 
the National Assembly the ratification of all national treaties (see Murray and 
Nakhjaveni 2009), as well as a state of national defence. Thirdly, the NCOP 
elects four of the 23 members of the Judicial Service Commission CTSC) which 
selects judges. Fourthly, its weakest form of participation is the approval of 
legislation that does not affect provinces (so-called section 75 bills), but with 
only a delaying power similar to that of the House of Lords. In making the 
latter decision, the NCOP does not operate as nine provincial delegations; 
instead, each member has an individual vote. 
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Thus far the NCOP has shown very little interest in the above functions. 
First, when deciding on the co-ratification of treaties - its most powerful 
position - there has hardly been any debate. This could be attributed to the 
NCOP's relatively weak position in a parliamentary system under the strong 
hand of the executive and hence the ruling party. Delegates are also 
politically relatively weak; in the political rankings they are elected after the 
National Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures have been constituted, and 
many of delegates are drawn from the list of unsuccessful candidates for those 
two legislatures. It is not a prized position either, because delegates, unlike 
MPs and MPLs, may be removed at any time by a provincial legislature, giving 
them a sense of insecurity. Once elected, the 54 permanent delegates (the 36 
special delegates mainly attend big occasions) face an uphill battle against the 
numerically superior NA. Moreover, as the ANC controls eight of the nine 
provinces and exercises strong party discipline, no independent provincial 
voice has yet sounded from the NCOP. 
3.2 National executive: cabinet and civil service 
Unlike the case in Kenya, there is no constitutional measure to ensure that the 
president attracts broad support across the provinces. Following the 
parliamentary system, the party with the majority in the NA elects, from 
among its members, the president, who then resigns from Parliament. 
However, this does not establish an executive president independent of the 
NA; the latter can remove him or her by a vote of no confidence. Whether the 
president has broad provincial support depends on the internal functioning 
of his or her party. In the case of the ANC, it has become very much 
province-based: not only has the provincial state structure of government 
been replicated in ANC party structures, but its functioning has also been 
'provincialised' (Steytler 2004; Steytler 2014). 
Apart from the first five years of a constitutionally mandated government of 
national unity, the president had an open hand regarding cabinet appoint-
ments, but since 1999 the ANC has included minority parties in cabinet. This 
was not always to ensure provincial representation, although it happened to be 
the case in respect of the IFP with its heartland in rural KwaZulu-Natal. After 
the initial government of national unity, President Mbeki included members of 
the IFP in his cabinet in 1999, but the IFP declined the offer in 2004. However, 
the ascendency of Jacob Zuma, who is seen as an even greater Zulu 
traditionalist than Buthelezi, led not only to a decline of IFP support in 
KwaZulu-Natal from 36.8 per cent in 2004 to 22.4 per cent in 2009, but to a 
situation in which no cabinet position was offered to the party (Francis 2009). 
The inclusive cabinet practice has not included the main opposition party, 
the Democratic Alliance. It should be noted, though, that the ANC govern-
ment has consistently appointed DA members to ambassadorships, the most 
notable instance being when Zuma sent the former leader of the DA, Tony 
Leon, to Argentina. 
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The ANC has also sought to bring in vocal minority voices to the centre. 
Mbeki made the leader of an Africanist and socialist party, AZ.APO, a minister 
in 2004, despite the fact that this party garnered only 0.25 per cent of the 
vote at the polls. Zuma went in the other political direction by appointing the 
leader of the Afrikaner right-wing party, Freedom Front Plus, as a deputy 
minister of agriculture; although the party attracted only 0.88 per cent of the 
vote, it represents an important farming lobby (Heyn 2009). 
This analysis has been concerned so far with the inclusion of external 
parties that may or may not have a provincial base. The more difficult 
question, of course, is how the ANC deals with representivity within its own 
ranks both with regard to race and ethnicity. Non-racialism and non-ethnicity 
are core principles of the ANC, yet questions of representivity always bubble 
under the surface. Race, with reference to whites, has no provincial 
dimension, but Indian and coloured representation may have a provincial 
connection to KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, respectively. The ethnic 
link is much stronger, as seven of the nine provinces have a dominant 
language. 
Although never openly aired, one of the accusations made against Mbeki in 
his leadership battle with Zuma in 2007 was that his government was the 
'Xhosa Nostra'. Giving credence to this claim was the fact that nearly half of 
his cabinet were Xhosa-speakers whose linguistic home is the Eastern Cape 
(Van Onselen 2013). By contrast, fears were expressed that under Zuma there 
would be a 'Zulufication' of the executive. As far as the 2009 cabinet was 
concerned, Zulu-speakers accounted for no more than their national 
demographic figure of 22.4 per cent (Van Onselen 2009). However, Mashele 
(2012) points out that the majority of cabinet members as well as most heads 
of security agencies came from KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). He also asks: 'As most 
important international events are hosted in KZN, how would our Zulu 
compatriots defend themselves against the accusation that they are not 
different from the Kalenjins of Kenya?' 
Given South Africa's history of racist rules and sexist practices, the focus in 
the Constitution is primarily on racial and gender representivity in public 
office. For instance, in the case of judicial appointment by the JSC, the 
Constitution states that 'the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the race 
and gender composition of South Africa must be considered' (s 174(2)). A 
similar requirement applies to appointments to the various commissions 
supporting constitutional democracy - that is, the Human Rights Commis-
sion, the Commission on Gender Equality, and the Electoral Commission 
(s 193(2)). The inclusive term 'broad representation' is used only with 
reference to the public service, but this, too, is linked to 'the need to redress 
the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation' (s 195(1)(i)). The 
reduction in the number of whites in the public service over the past two 
decades has been dramatic but their representation is still higher than their 
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demographic figure of ten per cent. Much less 'transformed' has been the 
judiciary, where only 60 per cent of judges are black - a vast improvement 
nevertheless from 1993 when there was only one judge of colour. 
A provincial dimension, however, has crept in with regard to the racial 
category of coloureds in the Western Cape. The Department of Correctional 
Service's policy is that its personnel demographics in each province must be 
similar to the national demographics. Consequently, although coloureds 
comprise 51 per cent of the Western Cape's population, the Department will 
employ coloureds in that province only up to 8 per cent of its workforce and 
ranks. Affected personnel successfully appealed to the Labour Court that the 
policy was discriminatory on the basis of race by not taking the provincial 
dimension into account when determining quotas. The final ruling has yet to 
be given by the Constitutional Court. 
While race is ever-represent as a factor, the focus may well shift to linguistic 
or ethnic concerns, particularly if the perception emerges during Zuma's two 
terms of the 'Zulufication' of top positions in the civil service. 
4 COHERENT GOVERNMENT: LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE 
COOPERATION 
The new system of devolved government was premised on the notion that 
'cooperative government' would ensure coherent governance. The chapters 
in the Constitution dealing with national, provincial and local government are 
thus prefaced by a short chapter on cooperative government that establishes 
two broad principles. 
The first is the recognition of the distinctiveness of each sphere of 
government, which requires that the powers, functions, and institutional 
integrity of each sphere be respected by the others. The second principle 
emphasises that the end-goal of all three spheres of government is to 'provide 
effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Repu-
blic as a whole' (s 41(l)(c)). To this end, all spheres of government 'must 
co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith' by 
(i) fostering friendly relations; 
(ii) assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on matters of 
common interest; 
(iv) co-ordinating their action and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another (s 41(l)(g)). 
That coordination and cooperation are necessary stems from a complex set of 
rules, set out in Chapter 8, as to how powers and functions are allocated to 
the three spheres. National government exercises concurrent powers with 
the provinces over key social functions (Schedule 4), and both the national 
and provincial governments must concurrently regulate and supervise local 
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government (Schedules 4B and SB). In addition, the cut-off points between 
the powers of each sphere are at best murky (Steytler and Fessha 2007). For 
coherent governance, a high level of cooperation is thus required at both 
legislative and executive levels. . 
As the system of government includes local government, the latter must 
also form part of the national system of intergovernmental relations. The 
constitutional assumption is that the nine provinces would represent 
themselves in their relations with the national government. Such an 
assumption was not feasible with regard to local government, which at the 
time of the drafting of the 1996 Constitution comprised 824 local authorities. 
Uniquely, from a comparative perspective (Steytler 2009), the Constitution 
provided for organised local government to represent the voice of all 
municipalities; national legislation must provide for the recognition of 
national and provincial organisations representing municipalities, and deter-
mine how they consult with the national and provincial governments (s 163). 
In terms of the resultant Organised Local .Government Act of 1997, the South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA) has been recognised as the 
organisation representing municipalities nationally. Its leadership has been 
drawn mainly from the mayors of the larger, mostly metropolitan, municipali-
ties. 
In the Constitution it is envisaged that intergovernmental relations and 
cooperative government are effected by the two branches of government -
the legislatures and the executives. In the legislative branch the NCOP is 
envisaged as playing the paramount role of ensuring cooperation and 
coordination with regard to the national legislative framework; in reality it is 
eclipsed by the executive and the political environment in which it operates. 
4.1 Legislative intergovernmental relations 
One of the NCOP's primary functions is to bring a provincial dimension to the 
national legislative process. Section 42( 4) expresses this as follows: 
The National Council of Provinces represents the provinces to ensure that provincial 
interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government. It does this by 
participating in the national legislative process and by providing a national forum for public 
consideration of issues affecting the provinces. 
In the legislative process, the NCOP must approve any bill that 'affects' 
provinces (a so-called section 76 bill), a requirement that the Constitutional 
Court has interpreted generously (Tongoane and Others v Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC)). Where the NCOP rejects 
a bill which the NA has approved, the bill first goes to a mediation committee, 
comprising equal members from each house, which seeks to find a 
compromise. Should that fail, the NA may override the NCOP with a 
two-thirds vote. For a vote on a section 76 bill, a provincial delegation, voting 
en bloc, must obtain a mandate from its provincial legislature, which follows 
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after a debate in the latter. A bill is passed with the support of five of the nine 
delegations. In the case of a constitutional amendment, six of the nine must 
be in support. 
During the past 17 years, the NCOP has played a limited role µi the national 
legislative process and has done little to stem the tide of centralising 
provincial functions such as social welfare grants and further education 
colleges (Powell 2015; see also Parliament 2008). A study of the third 
Parliament (2004 to 2009) revealed that, of the 230 bills introduced, only 39 
(17 per cent) were section 76 bills (Mafilika 2013). Merely one bill was 
introduced in the NCOP, which meant that in all other cases the NCOP 
debated bills only after the NA had the first bite at the cherry. Furthermore, 
most of the public input occurred during the NA's public hearings, including 
those of organised local government. The NA effected changes in 81 per cent 
of the bills. Although the NCOP did not trail far behind, with suggested 
changes to 70 per cent of the bills, such amendments were mostly technical 
or editorial in nature and acceptable to the NA, with no referrals having been 
made to a mediation committee. However, in 2014 the NCOP showed some 
resistance to a bill passed by the NA; the Traditional Courts Bill was allowed 
to lapse because key ANC-controlled provincial legislatures - Gauteng, 
Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal - rejected the bill (see Hlong-
wane 2014). 
As mentioned earlier, the NCOP's performance should be seen in the 
context of the dominance of the ruling party over the entire system of 
multilevel government (Murray and Simeon 2009). First, as already noted, the 
NCOP has been likened to representing the 'third team' of political parties, 
after the election of MPs and MPLs to the NA and provincial legislatures, 
respectively. They are unlikely to muster much opposition against the voice 
of the first team in the NA. Secondly, provincial legislatures have been 
functioning poorly. They have passed limited legislation (no more than five 
laws per year) and, being subject to a strong party hierarchy, have not 
formulated mandates for their delegates that would directly contradict 
national legislation. Thirdly, within the parliamentary context where the 
NCOP's 54 permanent members have limited access to research capacity, 
they are no match for the 400 MPs in the NA, let alone for party discipline. 
Intergovernmental institutions and processes take a long time to mature. 
The second house in the Indian Parliament was moribund for years and only 
came to life when the Indian Congress began to lose power in the country's 
states. Despite its design deficiencies, then, the NCOP may still play an 
independent role in the future, but that may be a long way off. 
Since 1994, opposition parties have held no more than two provinces 
(1994: two; 1999: one; 1 2004: none; 2009: one; 2014: one). For the 2014 
1 The Western Cape was initially won by a coalition of the Democratic Party and the National 
Party, which then formed the Democratic Alliance. When some members of the National Party 
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election the DA had high hopes of capturing an additional province or two -
the Northern Cape and perhaps Gauteng - but these came to naught. 
However, it is only after capturing four provinces that opposition parties can 
play a meaningful role in the NCOP by blocking certain constitutional 
amendments. Unlike the case in the NA, where only 34 per cent of the vote is 
needed to block constitutional amendments, five provincial block votes (or 
44 per cent) are needed in the NCOP. Even if in 2019 the DA captures the 
Northern Cape (the least populous province) and Gauteng (the most 
populous province, with ten times the population of the Northern Cape), it 
will not change the balance of power in the NCOP. 
Such a swing in party support will have a much greater impact on the NA as 
it will translate into at least 34 per cent of opposition seats in that chamber, 
providing the opposition with a blocking vote in regard to constitutional 
amendments. Because of the equality of provinces, and voting in blocks, 
political changes through the NCOP will be much slower. 
4.2 Executive intergovernmental relations 
Given the dominant role that the executive plays in the parliamentary system, 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) between executives of the different 
governments are crucially important to governance. In South Africa these 
relations are managed through both formal and informal institutions and 
processes. The Constitution has sought to formalise and institutionalise 
intergovernmental relations: section 41(2)(a) requires that an Act of Parlia-
ment must 'establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote and 
facilitate intergovernmental relations ' . Even before the 1996 Constitution 
came into operation in February 1997, informal intergovernmental relations 
fora had sprung up when provinces were established in 1994. The national 
ministers and the nine members of the provincial executives (MECs) dealing 
with the same concurrent functional areas (health, transport, local govern-
ment and so on) established informal fora, called MinMECs, to serve as 
vehicles for consultation and cooperation. Only the IGR fora for education 
and finance were given statutory form. 
In terms of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act of 1997 a Budget 
Council and Budget Forum were established, with the former comprising the 
minister of finance and the nine MECs for finance, while the Budget Forum 
included organised local government as well. An all-inclusive Intergovern-
mental Relations Council, presided over by the president, had a short 
shelf-life as it proved to be unwieldy and unproductive (DPLG 1999). The 
policy adopted by the national department responsible for intergovernmental 
relations (at the time called the Department of Provincial and Local 
broke away to join the ANC (and the electoral law was amended in 2001 to accommodate this), 
the ANC also took control of the Western Cape. The DA won the 2009 election in the Western 
Cape and has since held power in that province. 
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Government) was that the informal system should mature before effect was 
given to the constitutional mandate of national legislation. It was only when 
the Constitutional Court commented on the absence of similarly mandated 
legislation relating to the settlement of intergovernmental disputes 
(s 41(2)(b); National Gambling Board v Premier, KwaZulu-Natal 2002 (2) 
SA 715 (CC)) that the process began of drafting such an Act, which 
culminated in the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act of 2005 
(IGRFA). 
The IGRFA established a system of interconnected IGR fora as well as 
principles and mechanisms for dispute settlement. At the top of the system is 
the President's Coordinating Council (PCC), comprising the president, five 
national ministers (the deputy president, the minister in the Presidency, the 
minister responsible for provincial and local government, the minister of 
finance, and the minister for the public service), the nine provincial premiers 
and the chairperson of SALGA. In the various sectors of concurrent 
jurisdiction, MinMECs continue to function but have to include SALGA if the 
sector has an impact on local government. Each of these fora is to be 
supported by a technical forum comprising officials from the participating 
governments. 
Comparative federal practice and theory suggest that an IGR forum is the 
meeting place of equals; each government has its allocated powers and 
functions which it exercises with a measure of autonomy, and a forum thus 
facilitates consultation between and coordination among such autonomous 
governments (Watts 2001). The language of IGRFA suggests, however, a clear 
top-down hierarchy, resulting in what has been termed 'coercive' intergovern-
mental relations (Steytler 2011). 
The objects of the Act are given as: (a) coherent government; (b) effective 
provision of services; (c) monitoring implementation of policy and legisla-
tion; and ( d) realisation of national priorities (s 4). Their primary purpose 
appears to be the pursuit of national priorities, which would determine 
which services are to be effectively provided. Such services should be 
provided in a coherent manner, with their effective implementation being 
monitored. The national IGR fora are then envisaged as vehicles for 
conveying 'national priorities', the effective implementation of which they 
then monitor. The PCC is thus couched as a consultative forum 'for the 
President' (s 6, emphasis added), not for both the president and premiers 
operating as equals. The president may also use the council 'to discuss 
performance in the provision of services in order to detect failures and to 
initiate preventive and corrective action when necessary' (s 7 (c)) . To this end, 
the president may use the forum to consider reports 'dealing with the 
performance of provinces and municipalities' (s 7(d)(ii)). 
A MinMEC performs a similar function: its role is described as 'a 
consultative forum for the Cabinet member responsible for the functional 
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area' (s 11, emphasis added). The linkages between the PCC and MinMECs 
also give effect to the top-down hierarchy. The PCC may refer matters to 
MinMECs, who must then report back to the PCC. The possibility of 
communication upwards is more complex. A cabinet minister may refer a 
matter to the PCC only in consultation with the president, that is, with the 
agreement of the president (s 12(2)). 
In sharp contrast to national-provincial hierarchy is the more egalitarian 
approach to provincial-local relations. The role of the Premier's Intergovern-
mental Forum is to be 'a consultative forum for the Premier of a province and 
local government in the province' (s 18, emphasis added). The overall 
conception is that the national IGR fora are important governing and 
monitoring rather than consultative fora and that they are, by implication, not 
sites where equals meet. Although provinces cannot be seen as equal to the 
national government in powers and resources, they have a measure of 
autonomy, and it is with respect to that autonomy that they must be treated as 
equals. In a system of 'coercive' intergovernmental relations, IGR fora 
become instruments of centralised control and, in the name of 'coordination', 
vehicles for national command. Although in theory the IGRFA expressly 
provides that IGR fora are not executive decision-making bodies and meant 
only for consultation and discussion (s 32), practice tells a different story. 
Alongside the formal institutions and process are the informal practices of 
engagement. The most important are the twice-yearly extended cabinet 
meetings: in the first of these, held in January, the national government's 
comprehensive programme of action for the year is adopted, and in the 
second, held in July, progress towards it is reviewed. The full national cabinet 
is joined by the nine premiers and the chairperson of SALGA. While the latter 
may serve to provide a provincial and local perspective, they are also drawn 
into the centre by having to submit to cabinet quarterly reports on the 
programme of action (Powell 2015). 
The practice of intergovernmental relations is informed by and embedded 
in the broader political context of one-party dominance. Working within a 
strong hierarchical party structure, ANC premiers are not likely to articulate 
contrary provincial positions, given, after all, that they have been appointed 
to their positions by the president. Under his presidency of the ANC, Mbeki 
selected the premiers, which often did not include the leader of the 
provincial party structure. After the 2007 ANC electoral conference at which 
Mbeki lost to Zuma, the centralised appointment process was softened 
slightly: the provincial structure could nominate three names to the national 
party bosses in order of preference. After the 2009 provincial elections, 
because all eight of the provincial chairpersons who topped the nomination 
lists were male, four of them made way for centrally appointed female 
premiers. A strong line of accountability thus runs from the premier to the 
ANC president (Murray and Simeon 2010; Steytler 2014). 
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The resignation of the premier of Limpopo, Cassal Mathale, in July 2013 is 
illustrative. Zuma, acting in his capacity as president of the ANC, recalled the 
luckless premier from his holiday in Italy to give him his marching orders for 
allegedly not supporting his (Zuma's) candidature at the 2012 ANC electoral 
national conference. After the 2014 election seven of the eight provincial 
chairpersons, all men, were appointed as premiers, the sole exception being 
in the Northern Cape where a woman was nominated as premier (probably 
because the provincial chairperson was facing serious fraud charges). The 
same top-down pattern prevails in the MinMECs. Meetings have been 
described as information sessions given by national departments to provin-
ces, and the provincial MECs in the MinMECs are sometimes jokingly referred 
to as the national minister's deputy ministers. 
Where serious differences of opinion emerge between ANC premiers and 
the national government, they are seldom aired in the formal space of an IGR 
forum but dealt with through the party's hierarchical structures. Although it is 
reported that discussions in the PCC are open and frank and that consensus is 
sought (Powell 2015), it is likely that only the opposition-held province of the 
Western Cape would use IGR fora to articulate contentious issues. Whatever 
happens at a political level, the real coordination work is done by officials in 
the various technical IGR structures and outside them (Powell 2015). 
4.3 Intergovernmental dispute settlement 
A further component of the IGRFA is the formalisation and structuring of 
methods to settle intergovernmental disputes. The Constitution requires 
organs of state to avoid litigation and empowers courts to refer disputes back 
to parties if they have not made 'every reasonable effort to settle the dispute 
by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose' (s 41(3); 
see further Steytler 2001). Where specific sectoral legislation or service 
agreements do not provide for such mechanisms and procedures, the IGRFA 
requires the formal declaration of a dispute, after which the parties must 
agree on an alternative dispute-resolution mechanism. If the parties fail to 
reach an agreement, the national minister may provide assistance. 
The Constitutional Court has stated that 'the obligation to settle disputes is 
an important aspect of co-operative government which lies at the heart of 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution' (National Gambling Board v Premier of 
KwaZulu-Natal and Others 2002 (2) SA 715 (CC) at para 44). This flows from 
the basic premise of the system of multilevel government, namely that it does 
not embody 'competitive federalism' but 'co-operative government' (In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19961996 
(4) SA 744 (CC) at para 287). This, in turn, entails that where possible 
disputes should 'be resolved at a political level rather than through adversarial 
litigation' (National Gambling Board, at para 33). 
The Constitutional Court has taken compliance with this duty seriously, 
holding that a court would 'rarely decide an intergovernmental dispute unless 
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the organs of state involved in the dispute have made every reasonable effort 
to resolve it at a political level' (Uthukela District Municipality v President of 
the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 678 (CC) at para 14). On a number 
of occasions the courts have refused to entertain a matter because the parties 
had not complied with this obligation. 
The duty to avoid litigation, however, is no bar to approaching the courts. 
Due to the strong party hierarchy, litigation between ANC-controlled 
governments has been very rare. The only example is when the ANC-
controlled Johannesburg Metropolitan Council challenged the ANC-governed 
Gauteng Provincial Government over the proper definition of 'municipal 
planning' and won (Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng 
Development Tribunal 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC)). 
The disputes that arise publicly and frequently end up in court are tussles 
between different political parties. During the first Parliament (1994-99) the 
KwaZulu-Natal government under the IFP, and the Western Cape under the 
National Party, challenged the national government on a number of issues, 
although not always successfully. The same trend continued during the 
second Parliament, but then only in the case of KwaZulu-Natal, still under IFP 
control. 
When the DA captured the City of Cape Town in 2006 and the Western 
Cape in 2009, what ensued was political contestation rather than the 
'fostering of friendly relations' and 'avoidance of litigation' . When the DA won 
the City of Cape Town under the leadership of Helen Zille, the DA's national 
leader, the ANC sought to clip her wings. The Western Cape provincial 
government, which had introduced a strong executive mayor system, 
attempted to change it unilaterally into an executive committee system that 
not only gave the ANC a proportional number of seats on the executive 
committee but also significantly reduced the mayor 's power. It was only 
through an intervention by the national minister that a compromise was 
reached and litigation avoided (Akintan and Christmas 2006). In the High 
Court, Zille also successfully contested Premier Ibrahim Rasool's appointment 
of a judicial commission of inquiry into alleged misuse of municipal funds for 
party use (Mayor of the City of Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape 
2008 (6) SA 345 (C)). 
Since the DA took charge of the Western Cape, it has sought to test the 
constitutional space of provincial powers, which has provoked strong 
opposition from the national government. For instance, the premier, Helen 
Zille, appointed a commission of inquiry - headed by Justice Kate O'Regan 
(a retired Constitutional Court judge) and Mr Vusi Pikoli (a former National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, who was fired by President Mbeki for 
charging the national commissioner of police on corruption charges) - to 
.. inquire into poor policing in Khayelitsha, a large black township wracked by 
violent crime. 
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Policing is a national function but provinces have a limited supervisory role 
to play, including the appointment of commissions of inquiry (s 206(5) 
Constitution). The national minister of police strongly contested the pre-
mier's right to appoint the commission on the grounds, among others, that 
there was no proper prior consultation and that the premier acted outside the 
Constitution by giving the commission subpoenaing powers. The High Court 
rejected the minister's application to interdict the commission from procee-
ding;but the Minister appealed against the adverse decision. The Constitutio-
nal Court eventually found that the premier had acted within her constitutio-
nal powers and that the commission could proceed (Minister of Police and 
Others v Premier of the Western Cape and Others 2014 (1) SA 1 (CC)). 
What the relations between the Western Cape and the national government 
show is that real intergovernmental relations take place when there are 
political differences between the power-holders of different orders of 
government. Politicians and officials often remark that cooperative govern-
ment is achieved where the governments of two orders of government 
belong to the same party. This is true, of course, but intergovernmental 
relations are then mainly dealt with through the party system, which is likely 
to be strictly hierarchical. But a devolved system of government is not 
designed on the assumption that one party will be in control of all political 
institutions; on the contrary, the aim is to accommodate a diverse set of 
interests. Healthy intergovernmental relations and cooperative government 
come to the fore precisely when there is political contestation. Tolerance 
then becomes the vital political value; while political competition takes place, 
cooperation in the interest of the community must continue. 
5 SOCIAL SOLIDARl1Y: PREVENTING PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL 
STATE FAILURE 
While there are spaces where the different spheres can operate as equals, 
there are also areas where the relationship should be hierarchical when the 
national government exercises supervisory powers over provinces (and the 
provinces over municipalities). Supervision has two dimensions: the first is 
the duty of support, and the second, the power (and sometimes duty) to 
intervene. 
In South Africa the need for supervision soon became evident. The 
establishment of new provinces and municipalities, coupled with the 
unevenness of skills distribution across the country, required considerable 
support to stem the tide of maladministration. As the old discredited and 
corrupt homeland administrations were absorbed by some of the new 
provinces, these institutions continued to be a vehicle for many to 
accumulate wealth, resulting in elite capture and corruption. For example, 
education departments in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo became dysfunctio-
nal and unable to provide decent education to millions of learners; similarly, 
in a number of municipalities basic services such as clean water and 
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sanitation are not provided. Thus, to ensure a minimum level of uniform 
service delivery across provinces and municipalities, supervisory measures 
are needed to ensure social solidarity and effective governance across the 
nation. 
The Constitution hence imposes the duty of support on the national 
government with respect to both provinces and local government, and on 
provinces with respect to local government. Also, in certain circumstances 
the values of autonomy and the principles of cooperative government give 
way to decisive interventions. However, when an intervention takes place 
within a charged political context of inter-party or intra-party contests, it is 
possible that such powers may be abused for political ends. 
5.1 Duty of support 
The Constitution obligates the national government to assist provinces 'to 
develop the administrative capacity required for the effective exercise of their 
powers and the performance of their "functions" (s 125(3)). This may take 
the form of legislation or other measures. Likewise, the national government 
and the provinces 'must support and strengthen the capacity of municipali-
ties to manage their own affairs' (s 154(4). See also s 155(6) on the provinces' 
duty of support). In respect of municipalities, there have been a number of 
national support programmes, such as Operation Clean Audit, none of which 
has been a sparkling success, mostly because the provision of external 
support does not necessarily change the internal capacity or culture. 
5.2 Interventions in provinces 
Section 100(1) of the Constitution provides that the national executive may 
intervene when a province 'cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation 
in terms of the Constitution or legislation' . The national executive may take 
any 'appropriate steps to ensure the fulfilment of the obligation', including 
issuing a directive (a command) and assuming responsibility for that 
obligation in the place of the province. As the latter measure is a drastic 
breach of provincial autonomy, it may take place only to the extent necessary 
(a) to maintain essential national standards, or to meet established minimum 
standards for the rendering of a service; (b) to maintain economic unity or 
national security; or (c) to prevent the province from taking unreasonable 
action that is prejudicial to the interests of another province or the country as 
a whole (s lOO(l)(b)). 
Certain checks and balances were built into the system, given that there 
was strong awareness of the abuses of presidential rule that occurred in India 
under Indira Gandhi's regime, where states were taken over by the Union 
government merely because the Congress Party had lost state elections 
(Dhavan 1998; Narang 2007). As the provincial voice, the NCOP is given the 
mandate of reviewing the intervention; at any time after an intervention 
began it may terminate the intervention, which, in any event, may not 
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continue after 180 days if there has not been a positive approval of the 
intervention. Following its usual procedure, a supportive vote of five 
provinces is required to veto the intervention. It should be noted that the 
national executive has no power to suspend or dissolve a provincial 
legislature (and hence has no power to dismiss the premier). 
The power of assuming responsibility for a particular obligation was first 
exercised in 2011 when the national executive intervened in the Eastern 
Cape's shambolic Department of Education. Then, in January 2012, decisive 
action was taken against Limpopo, where, in addition to the Provincial 
Treasury and Department of Education, three other departments were placed 
under administration until February 2015. At the same time, similar measures 
were taken in respect of departments in the Free State and Gauteng. These 
actions signalled a break with past practice, where 'informal' interventions 
took place in the form of active support but formal sanctions against wayward 
ANC-controlled provinces were otherwise avoided in order to steer clear of 
political embarrassment. 
During the intervention in Limpopo, its premier, Cassal Mathale, lashed out 
at the national government, claiming that the intervention served merely as 
punishment because he and the ANC provincial structure had not supported 
Zuma's re-election as president of the ANC; other provinces, it was 
contended, were in equally poor shape. 2 The claim (which Mathale did not 
later pursue) raises questions about the NCOP's effectiveness as a check on 
the exercise of this national power. As noted above, the NCOP can veto such 
interventions at any time in the form of peer review. Two conflicting forces 
bear on this review process. On the one hand, in theory the provinces can 
stop the intervention by setting the bar for an intervention very high, 
prompted in doing so by self-interest in protecting themselves from 
interventions in the future. On the other hand, the provinces under ANC 
control are bound by party discipline and are unlikely to go against a national 
decision. In Limpopo the maladministration was so egregious that political 
abuse of the intervention power could not seriously be raised. 
A second form of intervention, though indirect, is the temporary stoppage 
of transfer of funds (including the equitable share) if a province commits a 
serious or persistent breach of the requirements of good financial manage-
ment (s 216 Constitution). Such an intervention is also subject to the review 
of the NCOP, not by veto but by the same processes as those required for the 
passing of section 76 legislation (affecting provincial interests). 
However, despite poor financial management in the majority of provinces, 
this provision has not yet been used against provinces. In March 2015 the 
National Treasury stopped the transfers to 58 municipalities which were in 
2 As noted previously, Mathale was first removed as chairperson of the ANC provincial 
committee when the latter was disbanded, and was then told by Zuma to resign as premier in 
July 2013. 
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arrears w ith their payment of ESKOM, the national electricity utility, until 
they made suitable arrangements for repayment of their debt. SALGA 
contested the measure on various procedural grounds, but the nub of the 
problem lies in the fact that the sanction may affect the community - in 
particular the poor who are dependent on free basic services - when such 
services are reduced because of cash-flow problems. 
5,3 Interventions in municipalities 
Municipalities are subject to a more intrusive intervention regime. In the 
1996 text of the Constitution the regimes governing intervention into 
provinces and municipalities were exactly the same, with provinces exerci-
sing the supervisory power over municipalities (s 139). This was changed 
over time, first, by allowing indirectly for the dismissal of elected municipal 
councils, and then, in 2003, by allowing for mandatory intervention when 
municipalities are in a financial crisis. 
Three types of interventions are now provided for. The first is the ordinary 
discretionary type, which includes measures such as the assumption of 
responsibility and the dissolution of a council 'in exceptional circumstances' 
(s 139(1)(c)). In the case of an assumption of responsibility, the NCOP again 
performs its review function, similar to that in respect of provinces. In 
addition, the national minister responsible for local government may also veto 
the intervention. The dissolution of a council takes effect only 14 days after 
the minister and the NCOP have been notified, and if neither of them has 
vetoed the intervention within that period. The second type of intervention, 
financial in nature, obliges the provincial executive to take appropriate steps, 
which may include the dissolution of the council, where the latter has failed 
to approve a budget before the commencement of the new financial year. The 
third type also gives broad powers to the provincial executive to intervene 
when there is a financial crisis. It should be noted that in the latter two modes 
of intervention the NCOP does not play a review function at all. 
Provincial interventions in municipalities have occurred with worrying 
regularity in the past two decades due to their high levels of malt~dministra­
tion and corruption. By 2014, 67 interventions had been recorded, a number 
which indeed ought to be much higher: no financial interventions took place 
despite the fact that only 22 municipalities obtained clean audit reports for 
the 2012-13 financial year, with the majority receiving either disclaimers or 
qualified audit reports. The NCOP appears to have performed its review 
mandate with diligence. 
There have been very few claims of politically motivated interventions. 
One concerned the dissolution of ap. ANC-controlled district council by the 
DA-led Western Cape provincial executive because the former failed to pass a 
budget by the due date. It turned out that the province did not actively 
support the municipality to convene a council meeting where the budget 
could be passed. Because such a financial intervention was not subject to 
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NCOP review, the matter was reviewed by the courts, which set aside the 
decision on an interpretation of the Constitution and statutory law (Premier 
of the Western Cape v Overberg District Municipality 2011 (4) SA 441 
(SCA)). Even in cases where the NCOP has approved interventions, 
municipalities have successfully challenged them in court on substantive 
grounds (Mnqunu Local Municipality v Eastern Cape Provincial Govern-
ment [2009] ZAECBHC 14 Eastern Cape High Court). 
It is reported that none of the interventions undertaken up to 2013 have 
proven successful (Lund 2013). Twenty of them simply lapsed because of an 
intervening election, leaving the problems unresolved. As for the rest, a 
number of factors worked against success. When an intervention has taken 
place, the problems of maladministration are so deep-seated it requires 
considerable skill and resources to fix them, resources that provinces do not 
have. Moreover, provincially appointed administrators may be sent to rescue 
a municipality, but when they leave, it simply signals a return to the previous 
ways of maladministration and corruption. The call has thus been made 
repeatedly that problems should be addressed before they become intracta-
ble, an approach that necessitates an early-warning monitoring and support 
system. 
Several lessons emerge from both the provincial and the municipal 
interventions. First, newly created institutions often have serious establish-
ment problems requiring intervention. Secondly, rural areas face significant 
difficulties in attracting suitably skilled staff to govern them efficiently and 
responsibly, a challenge which makes sustained support necessary. Thirdly, 
capture by a rent-seeking elite is likely to happen where provincial and local 
government provide an avenue to wealth accumulation. Fourthly, a quick 
drop-in intervention that does little to change the environment on the ground 
is unlikely to bear fruit. 
6 CONCLUSION 
National political cohesion in South Africa has been informed by politics and 
one-party dominance conducted in the shadow of the Constitution. Although 
the NA could articulate a strong provincial voice through its 'nine multi-
member provincial constituencies', the dominant position of one political 
party cuts across provincial interests. The constitutional checks-and-balances 
role the NCOP should play on behalf of provinces has also been much diluted 
by the ANC's dominance in eight of the nine provinces, as a result of which 
the NCOP has not served as a brake on the centralisation of various provincial 
functions. The constitutional institutions designed for national cohesion and 
drafted in the abstract may not impose restraint on the national government 
until such time as a more evenly balanced political dispensation has emerged. 
Inclusion in the national arena remains as important as the exercise of 
subnational self-governance. With regard to the national executive and 
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national government. Here, politics are dominant and only inclusive politics 
will result in national cohesion. On this score, the ANC has had a long track 
record of maintaining an inclusive cabinet through its inclusion of minor 
opposition parties, but while the ethnic and/or linguistic composition of the 
cabinet and the administration has remained under the surface so far, it may 
become more visible in the future . 
Given a complex division of powers and functions, coherent governance is 
vital for the delivery of shared services, yet difficult to achieve. While the 
Constitution and legislation may provide guidance for coordination and 
cooperation, intergovernmental relations have been subject to the pressure of 
centralisation through the design and functioning of intergovernmental 
institutions and processes. The goal of coordination often becomes simply a 
code-word for centralised control. Operating under the aegis of a dominant 
party, official institutions and processes remain surface manifestations of 
cooperative government, with the real relations conducted within the party 
hierarchy. Where intergovernmental relations function across party-political 
boundaries, a political culture of tolerance and give-and-take negotiation is 
crucial (Watts 2001). In the absence of such a culture, as now seems to be the 
case with regards to the Western Cape, it becomes inevitable that intergo-
vernmental disputes are settled only through litigation. 
Where social solidarity is placed in jeopardy by subnational state failure, 
the rule of law, and not politics, must dominate; when politics drives the 
decision whether or not to intervene, the abuse of such power can often be 
stemmed only by the courts. In the present political configuration where the 
NCOP has not yet articulated a clear provincial voice, an effective review of 
national interventions may not always be forthcoming. 
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